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SESSION 9
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner  
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law  
Neal Couture 
Director of Government Procurement Law and Business Programs 
The George Washington University
I. A HAZY PICTURE ON PROCUREMENT SPENDING: AT THE BOTTOM (YET)?
A. The Decrease Slows. Although federal procurement spending decreased again last year, the 
amount of the decrease, less than two percent – felt much less painful than the more daunting drops 
in FY 2014 (closer to four percent) and FY 2013 (that was the big drop, at just over ten percent). 
Of course, the cumulative decrease is far more acute in certain sectors, but the big picture was less 
daunting than it’s been in the prior three years.  If the downward trend feels increasingly familiar, 
it should, with this being the seventh year of the federal procurement spending decline following the 
weirdly stable 2008-2011 plateau.
B. Running the Numbers, Finding the Bottom (Below $500 Billion)? Regular attendees of 
this conference are familiar with this chapter’s coverage of the post-millennium federal procurement 
spending trend.  The post-millennial binge (before the 2008 economic crisis) was significant not only 
for its longevity but for its size.  To review, in Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to 
just over $223 billion.  The following years, in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20 percent spending 
increases.  After steady increases in the middle of the decade, we reached an unprecedented plateau 
where federal procurement spending stabilized at approximately $540 billion from Fiscal Years 2008 
through 2011.  In 2009, we experienced the first decrease in federal procurement spending for well over 
a decade, but the decreases were statistically insignificant (and it took a number of years for the data 
to catch up).  Indeed, much of the post-2008 panic seemed either premature or an over-reaction, as, 
for a number of years, the only macro-level spending effect was an absence of growth or expansion. 
After the first statistically significant decrease in federal spending, in 2012, we finally experienced 
the first dramatic decline in spending and a plunge below the (oh-so-dramatic) $500 billion threshold 
in 2013. Whether or not we’ve struck bottom, prospects for expansion appear limited, and nothing 
suggests that the market will again flirt with the $500 billion threshold anytime soon.
Using adjusted figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and USAS-
pending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears that the annual increases in federal 
procurement were most dramatic from 2001 through 2008, cumulatively averaging more than three 
times the rate of inflation.  The experts correctly predicted that the growth rate eventually would 
taper. In 2009, the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally stalled.  Yet, as discussed in past years, 
despite the dire warnings, the market contraction unfolded far more slowly than anyone expected.  
The chart below summarizes this post-millenial procurement spending cycle.  Time will tell how 
far the reductions will go and whether they can be sustained.  As of last year, however, this chapter 
took a broader view of the spending picture to redefine the pie by including grant spending.  In that 
context, the bad news can be tempered or, in other words, the overall spending decrease appears less 
dramatic.
Reprinted from West Government ContraCts Year In revIeW CoverInG 2015 ConferenCe BrIefs, with 
permission of Thomson Reuters. Copyright © 2016. Further use without the permission of West is 
prohibited. For further information about this publication, please visit west.thomson.com/store, or 
call 800.328.9352.
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(in Billions of $)
Grant Spending 
(in Billions of $)
Procurement & Grant Spending 
(Combined, in Billions of $)
2015 $437.4* $609.1 $1,046.5
2014 $445.6 $603.9 $1,049.5
2013 $463.3 $523.4 $986.7
2012 $519.3 $544.2 $1,063.5
2011 $540.0 $571.6 $1,111.6
2010 $540.1 $623.2 $1,163.2
2009 $540.7 $675.6 $1,216.3
2008  $541.2 $420.6 $961.8
2007 $469.3 $430.2 $899.5
2006 $430.5 $490.0 $920.5
2005 $391.2 $441.7 $832.9
2004 $346.1 $450.1 $796.2
2003 $318.0 $493.7 $811.7
2002 $264.1 $406.3 $670.4
2001 $223.0 $330.8 $553.8
*FY 2015 figures reflect an estimate based upon preliminary reporting.  
See www.USASpending.gov. 
The total procurement spending amounts reported above, for every year, 2009-2014, changed 
significantly compared to last year’s USASpending reports. Changes to prior years tend to be 
less statistically significant.
C. Comparing (and Combining?) Contracts and Grants.  As dis-
cussed previously, contracting experts increasingly assert that less and less 
distinguishes a government contract from a federal grant.  Many contrac-
tors also compete for and receive grants.  Consistent with the trend this 
chapter has reported, grant spending exceeded procurement spending last 
year, as it has for thirteen of the last fifteen years.  Moreover, while grant 
spending fell after peaking in FY2010, grants – unlike contracts – never 
fell below the $500 billion threshold and now, again, have crossed the $600 
billion threshold. Moreover, the grant decline only lasted four years before 
climbing again, and the FY2014 increase was significant.  And, of course, 
the government appears to be investing additional resources in revamping 
the regulatory regime that applies to grants. See, generally, 2 C.F.R. 200.
D. Data Quality.  As noted above, the FPDS data is constantly be-
ing updated, supplemented, changed, and, presumably, corrected.  And 
ongoing analysis continues to cast doubt on these figures.  But they still 
represent the most useful data set accessible in the public domain.  CRS 
Surveys DOD Contract Obligations, FPDS Reliability, 57 GC ¶ 144 (“[T]
he Government Accountability Office ‘has repeatedly raised concerns 
over the accuracy, limitations, and reliability of the data contained in 
the FPDS-NG database.’ See 54 GC ¶ 124; 55 GC ¶ 180; 56 GC ¶ 263. 
‘Despite the limitations of FPDS, imperfect data are sometimes better 
than no data’ … [and, i]f Congress and policymakers understand the 
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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limitations, ‘FPDS data can be used to identify some broad trends and 
rough estimations, or to gather information about specific contracts.’”). 
Quite simply, generating accurate data is difficult. DPAP, DCMA Need To 
Improve Cost Analysis Oversight And Documentation, 57 GC ¶ 347 (DoD 
IG asserts that “DCMA still cannot reliably report on the number of cost 
analysis cases performed, the dollar value of contractor proposals ana-
lyzed, and the questioned costs reported[.]”).  On a related note, see GSA 
Transactional Data Collection Would Create Compliance Burden, Industry 
Group Says, 57 GC ¶ 167 (“GSA significantly underestimates the costs 
of modifying information systems and data quality control that Federal 
Supply Schedule vendors would incur under ... GSA[’s] proposed a pilot 
program to require reporting of transactional data – such as unit prices, 
quantities sold, manufacturers and part numbers – from holders of FSS 
contracts, other Government-wide acquisition contracts[,] and indefinite-
delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts.”); GSA Grossly Underestimates FSS 
Transactional Data Reporting Burden, ABA Section Warns, 57 GC ¶ 160; 
GSA Proposes Collecting Transactional Pricing Data, Phasing Out FSS 
Price Reductions Clause, 57 GC ¶ 79, 80 Fed. Reg. 11619 (March 4, 2015).
E. A Year Without Sequestration.  Fortunately, despite some last 
minute drama, the dramatic disruption of sequestration was not repeated 
in 2015.  That should not suggest a bright future for the kind of stable 
funding that facilitates efficient, long-term investment decisions.  In what 
can only be described as a strange election cycle, budgeting is difficult to 
handicap.  Fortunately, there appears to be bipartisan distaste for another 
shutdown, which should contribute to some amount of short-term budget 
stability, which is better than nothing.  
II.  2015 HIGHLIGHT: THE USD(AT&L) LPTA MEMORANDUM 
On March 4, 2015, USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall issued an important 
memorandum to the defense community: Appropriate Use of Lowest Priced 
Technically Acceptable Source Selection Process and Associated Contract 
Type.  The memorandum is short (only three pages, nine substantive para-
graphs), but it offers clear, direct guidance intended to rein in the (real or 
perceived) over-reliance on Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable (LPTA) 
procurement.  We have recommended it to students as an excellent example 
of clear, persuasive, and efficient writing, and we hope that it is widely 
circulated and considered.  Among other things, the memo explains that:
• “LPTA is the appropriate source selection process to apply only 
when there are well-defined requirements, the risk of unsuc-
cessful contract performance is minimal, price is a significant 
factor in the source selection, and there is neither value, need, 
nor willingness to pay for higher performance.”
• “LPTA has a clear, but limited place in the source selection 
‘best value’ continuum…. [and improper reliance on LPTA can 
cause DoD to] miss an opportunity to secure an innovative, cost-
effective solution to meet Warfighter needs to help maintain 
[DoD’s] technological advantage.”
• The selection of solicitation and contract type is also important, 
particularly with regard to services.  While fixed-price contracts 
NOTES
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are appropriate where DoD’s “requirements are firm, easily 
understood, and tied to clear, measureable outcomes,” they too, 
should only be used where appropriate.  Where DoD “cannot 
firmly predict the tasks, efforts, and required outcomes that 
the contractor will be expected to perform,” other contracting 
types – including cost-reimbursement contracts and time-and-
materials (T&M) contracts – make more sense.
We hope that this memorandum enjoys wide distribution and that it proves 
more effective in changing risk averse acquisition workforce behavior 
than OFPP’s well-intentioned, but, in retrospect, apparently ineffective, 
myth-busters campaign.
III. TECHNOLOGY: THE RE-DESIGN OF ACQUISITION.GOV
As we expect you’ve noticed by now, GSA has redesigned and re-
launched Acquisition.gov.  The site is visually pleasing, but, we have 
some concerns as to the priority given to appearance as opposed to user 
friendliness and utility. Indeed, we are reminded that USASpending.gov 
was created as a mirror image site of a non-government initiative under-
taken because the public was frustrated with its inability to access and 
manipulate data found in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). 
• We’re curious to know how the user community (in the broad-
est sense) perceives the FAR Part Index on the new FAR site, 
https://www.acquisition.gov/?q=browsefar.  
• To the extent that we now take for granted that the online ver-
sion of the FAR is the official version (rather than running to 
the library to check Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations), 
we’re increasingly disappointed that, as 2016 approaches, and 
our mobile phones and tablets contain apps that solve a mind-
boggling array of previously intractable problems, no one in the 
Government seems inclined to provide some of the most basic 
services sought with regard to the FAR System.  We hope that 
future redesigns will attempt to address, at a minimum:
- A single function that displayed, overlaid, and reconciled the 
FAR and all appropriate agency regulations.  In other words, 
for a hypothetical Army contracting action, the electronic re-
source would display the relevant FAR, DFARS, and AFARS 
regulations as a single document, with visual cues (whether 
font or color) to distinguish the various tiers of regulations.  
The standardized FAR numbering regime, dating back to 
its promulgation in 1984, anticipated the utility of such a 
function.
- A working archival function that displayed the FAR (and 
if possible, the appropriate agency regulations, as noted 
above) at a given date.  Working through arbitrarily dated 
Federal Acquisition Circulars (FAC’s) is confusing enough, 
but the benefits of the online FAR – for example, the direct 
links within the regulation, to provisions and clauses, and 
to statutes – are lost when attempting to work with prior 
versions.
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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• We’re also curious to know whether government employees 
are using the Acquisition Gateway, https://www.acquisition.
gov/acquisition_gateway. [GSA explains that: “The Acquisition 
Gateway, built by GSA, helps federal government buyers from 
all agencies act as one acquisition community. The Acquisition 
Gateway is a workspace that provides accurate, useful, and 
unbiased advice. It helps federal acquisition professionals learn 
what they need to know, connect with others to collaborate and 
communicate, and act to accomplish their tasks effectively.”]
IV.  OFPP, GOVERNMENT-WIDE POLICY, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY, CATEGORY MANAGEMENT, AND … 
SMALL BUSINESS?  
A. Information Technology on GAO’s High Risk List.  In the cal-
endar year following the high profile (and, at times, problematic) rollout of 
the new HeathCare.com web site, GAO added information technology (IT) 
to its high-profile High Risk List, http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/overview. (To 
be fair, we sense that the new web site was merely the straw that broke the 
camel’s back; IT procurement has bedeviled federal acquisition before, and 
will continue to do so in the future.) GAO Adds IT Acquisition Management 
To High-Risk List, 57 GC ¶ 46 (GAO found that “federal IT investments too 
frequently fail to be completed or incur cost overruns and schedule slip-
pages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes.” Moreover, “the 
Government has ‘spent billions of dollars on failed and poorly performing 
IT investments which often suffered from ineffective management, such 
as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and 
governance.’” GAO chastised the Government for implementing less than 
25 percent of GAO’s more than 730 recommendations made over five years – 
yes, that’s nearly 150 recommendations per year!); Agencies Need Improved 
Strategic Sourcing Of IT Services, 57 GC ¶ 341 (finding that: “DHS, NASA 
and the military services ‘have made strides in their efforts to strategically 
source IT services, but none have fully incorporated leading commercial 
practices.’”); House Subcommittees Eye FITARA Promises, Risks For IT 
Acquisition, 57 GC ¶ 181 (“FITARA[‘s] ....success depends on agencies’ 
implementation....”); CRS: Agencies Moving Slowly To Cloud Computing, 57 
GC ¶ 32 (Migration to the cloud has been “impeded by federal security re-
quirements, barriers imposed by agency culture, new network infrastructure 
requirements, the need for appropriate acquisition workforce expertise[,] 
… funding concerns…, the Government’s lengthy review processes[,] and 
… stringent privacy and reliability requirements….”).
B. Laptop and Desktop Purchasing.  Given the range of issues avail-
able, OFPP has an aggressive agenda.  OFPP Head Updates Acquisition 
Reform Plan, 57 GC ¶ 85 (“Progress has been made in bringing greater in-
novation into the acquisition system.”); OFPP Launches ‘Acquisition 360’ IT 
Vendor Survey, 57 GC ¶ 90 (“Rung described Acquisition 360 as ‘the first ever 
transaction-based feedback tool that allows agencies to identify strengths and 
weaknesses in their acquisition processes with the focus on pre-award activi-
ties, contract execution, and certain post award activities, such as debriefings.’” 
).  One of the most concrete initiatives, however, deals with IT hardware.  Last 
year, we discussed that one of Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) 
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Administrator Anne Rung’s priorities was category management.  Early on, 
she explained that “There is a critical need for a new paradigm for purchasing 
that moves from managing purchases and price individually across thousands 
of procurement units to managing entire categories of common spend and 
total cost through category management … [so] that agencies get the same 
competitive price and quality of performance when they are buying similar 
commodities under similar circumstances[.]” OFPP now hopes standard-
ize – and, to some extent, centralize – the purchase of laptop and desktop 
computers.  Anne Rung, OMB Memo M-16-02, Category Management Policy 
15-1: Improving the Acquisition and Management of Common Information 
Technology: Laptops and Desktops (October 16, 2015), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-02.pdf. 
Among other things, the ambitious memorandum explains that:
• The Federal Government spends over $50 billion a year on 
hardware, software, telecommunications, IT security, and IT 
professional services through tens of thousands of contracts and 
delivery orders…. However, many agencies continue to buy and 
manage their IT in a fragmented and inefficient manner, in a 
large part due to the highly decentralized structure of major 
cabinet level departments, which conflicts with the goals of 
… FITARA and with the principles of category management 
outlined … by [OFPP].
• In FY 2014, agencies awarded more than 10,000 contracts and 
delivery orders for common laptops and desktops totaling about 
$1.1 billion [frankly, we were expecting a much higher number], 
resulting in reduced buying power, inefficient duplication of 
contracts, and very little transparency into prices paid. Instead 
of … banding together as the world’s largest buyer to negotiate 
better prices and terms, too often [the Government] buys like 
thousands of small businesses, makings smaller awards for 
the same IT products across multiple agencies, and sometimes 
within a single organization.
• [Accordingly,] OMB has determined that agencies must take 
immediate steps [including]:
- standardize laptop and desktop configurations for common 
requirements;
- reduce the number of contracts for laptops and desktops by 
consolidating purchasing and using a fewer number of high-
performing - or best-in-class- contracts; and
- develop and modify demand management processes to 
optimize price and performance.
• [E]ffective immediately [with certain exceptions], agencies 
are prohibited from issuing new solicitations for laptops and 
desktops, and civilian agencies shall leverage the following 
existing vehicles …:  NASA Solutions for Enterprise-Wide 
Procurement (SEWP), General Services Administration (GSA) 
IT Schedule 708, or Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), National Institutes of Health (NIH), NITAAC Chief 
Information Officer-Commodities and Solutions (CIO-CS)[.]
9-6
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• [Saving money, exploiting economies of scale, appears to be 
a priority.] Agencies should focus the bulk of their acquisition of 
laptops and desktops on publicized buying events to maximize 
the Government’s collective buying power.
• [A new reporting requirement has been generated, in that] 
effective immediately, CIOs shall ensure that at least 80% of 
their agency’s new basic laptop and desktop requirements are 
satisfied with one of these standard configurations, unless an 
exception is consistent with an approved IT acquisition strategy 
or plan, as required by OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance, 
and approved in writing by the agency CIO. … [T]ransition plans 
are due by February 28, 2016, and will be collected through the 
Integrated Data Collection managed by OMB’s Office of the 
Federal Chief Information Officer.
• Agencies shall develop and implement [refreshment] policies 
and procedures…. Generally, agency CIOs shall adopt a uniform 
refresh cycle, such as replacing 25% of inventory every year for 4 
years or 20% of inventory every year for 5 years.
• [N]onetheless, m]aximizing small business utilization is 
a key category management principle and an important 
component of this policy. ... The percentage of desktop and 
laptop work (in dollars) awarded to small businesses in FY 2014 
under the three vehicles described above was 64%, or nearly 10 
percent greater than the small business participation rate for 
these commodities overall, and nearly 85% of the vendors on 
these solutions are small businesses.
We look forward to seeing how this plays out.
C. Another Busy Year In Small Business.  Last year, the small 
business community was abuzz over was the unusual achievement of the 
Congressionally-mandated twenty-three percent goal for small business 
participation. Given how rarely the government had achieved the statu-
tory goal, the benchmark drew more attention than the reality: that an 
increasingly diverse pool of small businesses were competing for – at least 
temporarily – a larger percentage of a steadily shrinking pie.
• The big winner this year appears to be women-owned small 
businesses (WOSB’s), who appear to be gaining some amount 
of access to sole source awards, previously the exclusive domain 
of the 8(a) community (and, for a turbulent period, Alaska Native 
Corporations (ANC’s)). SBA Authorizes WOSB Sole-Source Con-
tracts, 57 GC ¶ 288 (CO’s can now “award sole-source contracts 
[up to $6.5 million for manufacturing, up to $4 million for other 
contracts] to women-owned small businesses and economically 
disadvantaged WOSBs (EDWOSBs) in certain circumstances”); 
see also 80 Fed. Reg. 55019 (Sept. 14, 2015), SBA Proposes Rule 
To Authorize WOSB Sole-Source Contracts, 57 GC ¶ 152, 80 
Fed. Reg. 24846 (May 1, 2015).  Granted, the WOSB sole source 
authority appears far more limited what the 8(a) firms enjoy – 
both in terms of statutory authority and practice. To the extent 
9-7
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that the rule applies to “eligible … EDWOSBs for certain Federal 
contracts or orders in industries in which the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) determines that WOSBs are underrepre-
sented in Federal procurement[,]” the rule seems susceptible to 
the difficulties that ultimately gutted the small disadvantaged 
business (SDB) price preference following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995).  Note that the rule specifies that both “substantial under-
representation” and “underrepresentation” must be “determined 
by a study using a reliable and relevant methodology.”)  Stay 
tuned also for additional rulemaking on WOSB certification.
• The Veterans Administration’s procurement practices drew 
plenty of attention this year.  Federal Lawmakers, Veterans Groups 
Back Contracting Challenge To VA, 57 GC ¶ 280 (More than 40 
members of Congress “filed an amicus brief in support of a contrac-
tor suing the Department of Veterans Affairs” in Kingdomware 
Techs., Inc. v. U.S., 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also 56 GC ¶ 
194. The dispute involves the VA’s “discretion to procure services 
through the Federal Supply Schedule once it has met its contract-
ing goals for veteran-owned small businesses and service-disabled 
VOSBs.” See 57 GC ¶ 200(a). The Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case, later removed it from the argument docket and ordered 
supplemental briefing, then re-scheduled the argument for 2016.); 
VA Proposes Overhaul Of VOSB Verification Process, 57 GC ¶ 364 
(“The proposed rule ... would clarify VOSB eligibility requirements, 
revise definitions, reorder requirements and align provisions with 
other set-aside programs.”); Bill Introduced To Improve VOSB And 
SDVOSB Programs, 57 GC ¶ 363 (legislation would, among other 
things, “harmonize the definitions of VOSB and SDVOSB”); House 
Panels Probe VA Small Business Goals Reporting, 57 GC ¶ 197 
(“Jan Frye, deputy assistant secretary and senior procurement 
executive ... charged that VA has circumvented the required FSS 
use for billions of dollars worth of medical equipment[.]”).
• The Congressionally-mandated participation percentages con-
tinue to attract legislative attention, dominate agency leadership 
priorities and, ultimately consume scarce acquisition personnel 
resources. House Panel Surveys WOSB Awards, Small Business 
Goals, 57 GC ¶ 368 (highlighting the positive – achieving the 
government-wide 23 percent small business contracting goal – 
but bemoaning that “the Federal Government excludes nearly 
20 percent of its contracts before it figures out whether or not it 
met its goals.”); Leadership Attention Needed To Overcome SBA 
Management Challenges, GAO Says, 57 GC ¶ 339 (GAO suggests 
that: “SBA has [failed to implement] an effective human capital 
strategy, … not effectively managed acquisition and information 
technology … [and not addressed] deficiencies with SBA oversight 
of contracting programs for economically disadvantaged small 
businesses.”); Government Exceeds FY 2014 Small Business Goal, 
57 GC ¶ 199 (“FY 2014 percentage [24.99 percent] is the highest 
since Congress established the 23-percent goal in 1997.”); Advocacy 
Group Bemoans Small Business Dollars Going To Large Contrac-
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
NOTES
  9-9
tors, 57 GC ¶ 156 (Public Citizen suggests that SBA’s “claims of 
meeting or nearing the Government’s small business contracting 
goals ‘are misleading and rely on methodologies that conflict with 
federal law and regulations,’” and that the Government “relies on 
methodologies that present a false impression of the percentage 
of procurement that small businesses actually receive[.]”)  
• And, of course, plenty of other small business issues remain, from 
the adjustment of size standards to stewardship of the mentor-
protégé program and the management and enforcement of large 
business’ small business subcontracting plans.  Comprehensive 
Subcontracting Test Program Should Be Made Permanent, GAO 
Says, 57 GC ¶ 369; Committee Questions Whether Mentor-Protégé 
Benefits Flow To Protégés, 57 GC ¶ 338  (raising “concerns that 
mentor-protégé programs have become too focused on providing 
incentives to mentors rather than ensuring protégés actually 
receive their designated benefits.”); SBA’s FY 2016 Challenges 
Include Small Business Contracting Oversight, IG Says, 57 GC 
¶ 329 (“the IG’s “top challenge … revolves around weaknesses 
in small business contracting programs and inaccurate procure-
ment data[.]”); OFPP Defends Fair Pay And Safe Workplaces EO 
Implementation, 57 GC ¶ 300 (Representative Richard Hanna 
“lamented the burdens on small businesses imposed by the 
administration’s [thirteen executive orders (EO’s)] relating 
to Government contracting[.]”); Industry Coalition Suggests 
Changes To Proposed Small Business Subcontracting Rule, 57 
GC ¶ 263, 80 Fed. Reg. 32909 (June 10, 2015); see also, Industry 
Groups Ask White House To Halt Contractor EOs, 57 GC ¶ 256 
(“[T]he Professional Services Council, the Aerospace Industries 
Association, the National Defense Industrial Association and 
the IT Alliance for Public Sector, recently … [sought] a pause in 
executive orders that create new compliance requirements for 
Government contractors,” suggesting that “these unique and 
costly ... regulations simply raise an already substantial barrier 
between the commercial and government marketplaces.”); SBA 
Should Clarify Proposed Mentor-Protégé Rule Changes, ABA 
Section Says, 57 GC ¶ 112; Witnesses Question Proposed Small 
Business Size Changes, 57 GC ¶ 180; House Committee Passes 
Small Business Contracting Reforms, 57 GC ¶ 103; Reform Small 
Business Contracting, Witnesses Urge House Subcommittee, 57 
GC ¶ 84 (Reflecting a reduction in overall federal procurement, 
it is not surprising that “[a]lthough the percentage of prime 
contracts awarded to small businesses is rising, the number 
of small business contract actions has fallen nearly 60 percent 
– almost 70 percent at [DoD] – and small businesses’ share of 
subcontracted work has fallen nearly 2.5 percent”); GAO Flags 
Poor SBA Communication With HUBZone Firms, 57 GC ¶ 53 
(“GAO found problems stemming from frequent changes to 
HUBZone area designations, poor recertification processes, and 
inadequate SBA efforts to inform firms about changes affecting 
eligibility.”); SBA Should Clarify Proposed Rule On Small Busi-
ness Contracting, ABA Section Says, 57 GC ¶ 70.
NOTES
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V. DEFENSE ACQUISITION: REFORM, REGULATION,  
ASSESSMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF INNOVATION
A. Plenty of Congressional Activity; Assessing Acquisition 
Reform:  Congress, of course, remains interested in reforming federal 
acquisition.  Many of the recent legislative reform initiatives will be dis-
cussed in other chapters, but the jury remains out as to the impact of the 
changes. “[A] flurry of statutory changes and new provisions included in 
the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) … represent the 
largest single package of acquisition legislation since the land-
mark Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.  … [But, despite] 
calls for extensive changes to acquisition statutes, it is far less clear that 
these changes will result in meaningful operational change in the acqui-
sition system....” Andrew Hunter, CSIS 2016 Global Forecast: The Battle 
over How to Save Defense Acquisition, available at https://csis.org/files/
publication/151116_Hunter_Defense_Acquisition.pdf.  See also Senators, 
Witnesses Offer Suggestions For Reducing DOD Overhead Spending, 57 GC 
¶ 367 (“[Senator John] McCain noted that DOD currently has about 1.1 
million personnel performing ‘overhead activities,’ at a ‘staggering” cost.’)
B. Major Systems: No Shortage of Concerns and Reform Initia-
tives.  See, for example, House Committee Scrutinizes DOD Acquisition Cycle 
Times, 57 GC ¶ 337 (GAO observes that “because of competition for limited 
funding and a lack of incentives for realistic cost estimates at DOD, a ‘suc-
cessful’ business case is one that overstates or overpromises performance 
and understates cost and understates schedule[.]”); Aircraft Carrier Program 
Suffers Poor Outcomes, As Predicted, GAO Says, 57 GC ¶ 310 (GAO warned, 
among other things, that: “costs were underestimated and critical technolo-
gies were immature; cost “likely will exceed the program’s budget”;  “tests 
of … key technologies have been deferred by years”; “CVN 78 is unlikely 
to achieve promised aircraft launch and recovery rates as key systems are 
unreliable”; and “the business case for CVN 79 is also unrealistic[.]”); DOD 
Needs To Integrate Enterprise-Level Weapon-Systems Portfolio Reviews, 57 
GC ¶ 277 (“DOD’s governance structure includes decision-making processes 
and responsibilities that are divided among its stove-piped requirements, 
acquisition, and budget communities and focus largely on optimizing indi-
vidual investments.”); GAO Suggests Better Planning For Air Force Space 
Acquisitions, 57 GC ¶ 109 (“The current approach to technology insertion 
… is not consistent with the best practice of establishing a plan prior to the 
start of a program that identifies specific technologies to be developed and 
inserted to achieve a desired end state….”); DOD Needs Better Approach To 
Account For ACAT II And III Cost And Performance, 57 GC ¶ 77 (DoD “cannot 
provide reliable data on the number, total cost and performance of its current 
acquisition category (ACAT) II and III programs [, ...] non-major programs 
that range from multi-billion-dollar aircraft-radar modernization programs 
to clothing and protective equipment programs valued at tens of millions of 
dollars[.]”); CRS Surveys Nunn-McCurdy Act Breaches, 57 GC ¶ 75 (The article 
reminds readers that, “[i]n 2011, [CRS’s Moshe] Schwartz testified … that 
unrealistic cost estimates, unstable funding, insufficient testing early in the 
acquisition process, additional requirements[,] and poor contractor oversight 
all contribute to Nunn-McCurdy breaches. If Congress and DOD had known 
certain programs’ true costs at the start, ‘different decisions could have been 
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made, and billions of dollars spent on systems that were never fielded or 
prematurely cancelled could have been spent on other priorities[.]’ … See 53 
GC ¶ 113.); DOD Needs To Streamline Milestone Decision Process For Weapon 
Systems, 57 GC ¶ 59 (DoD “should eliminate levels of documentation review 
and information requirements that add limited value.... Programs GAO 
surveyed took an average of over two years to complete the documentation 
of information requirements for their last milestone[.]”)
C. Expectations For Improved Contingency Contracting.  Army 
Must Improve Oversight Of LOGCAP Task Orders, IG Says, 57 GC ¶ 340 
(Among other things, the IG found that: “of the six [contracting officer’s rep-
resentatives] CORs appointed to the task order…, four had not undergone 
required training. …;  the procurement CO (PCO) did not develop a quality 
assurance surveillance plan …; [and] on at least two of the … sites reviewed, 
the contractor began work before the CORs were on site to perform contractor 
surveillance.”); SIGAR Envisions Keys To Better Reconstruction Efforts, 57 
GC ¶ 286 (suggesting that: “Any future reconstruction effort must start with 
a clear, realistic set of objectives, and must use evidence-based policymaking-
-relying on measurable metrics to determine outcomes ... [and] caution[ing] 
against conflating political goals with development objectives[.]”); DOD 
Contingency Contracting Problems Persist, IG Finds, 57 GC ¶ 98  (identify-
ing “nine areas with systemic problems include[ing] requirements, contract 
pricing, contract type, source selection, oversight and surveillance, financial 
management, contractor personnel, contract documentation, and property 
accountability....” Moreover: “The effectiveness of contractor support of U.S. 
contingency operations could be compromised if DoD officials fail to apply les-
sons learned from previous problems identified in Iraq and Afghanistan....”); 
SPOT Guidance On Overseas Contractor Data Still Needs Improvement, 57 
GC ¶ 66 (“DOD does not ensure that SPOT and [Joint Asset Movement Man-
agement System] JAMMS ‘provide either contract or contractor personnel 
data that are consistently timely and reliable,’ GAO found, cautioning that 
‘DOD has incomplete visibility into the number of contractors present in the 
contingency environment.’”); SIGAR Finds Wasteful Practices, Poor Planning 
For Solid Waste Disposal, 57 GC ¶ 61 (despite having “spent over $81 million 
to build 23 solid waste incinerators at nine locations in Afghanistan, … many 
incinerators went unused or underused because they were not completed ac-
cording to contract requirements or were deficient in construction[.]”); DOD 
Has Implemented Most SIGAR Recommendations, 57 GC ¶ 27 (“SIGAR made 
209 recommendations to DOD [between 2008 and mid-2014 – only three 
dozen each year – of which] 161 recommendations, or 77 percent, have been 
implemented and closed”).
D. Better Buying Power (BBP) and The Harsh Reality of Techni-
cal Superiority, Innovation, and Research and Development.  Last 
year, we reported that USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s BBP 3.0 had taken 
a surprising (and, arguably, disappointing) turn, tilting heavily toward 
the micro rather than the macro, increasing the number of bullet points 
and reducing the size of the font on the summary Power Point slide.  As 
a result, the early release of BBP 3.0 felt more like a catch-all or a DoD-
wide acquisition improvement wish list than an aspirational guidepost. 
Few topics disappeared, and many appear to have been added.  Seem-
ingly lost in the late-2014 rollout, but re-emphasized in the Spring 2015 
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implementation plan, was the theme of “Achieving Dominant Capabilities 
through Technical Excellence and Innovation.” See, generally, BBP 3.0 
Implementation Directive Released, 57 GC ¶ 120; and discussion of prior 
BBP initiatives at 56 GC ¶ 306(c); 54 GC ¶ 358; 52 GC ¶ 312.  
1. The Focus on Technical Superiority.  The April 9, 2015 Better 
Buying Power Fact Sheet explains: “BBP 3.0 focuses attention on the over-
riding concern that our nation’s technological superiority is at risk. 
Our technological superiority is dependent on the effectiveness of our R&D 
efforts …. Innovation increasingly comes from the commercial sector and 
from overseas.”  These sentiments have been broadly echoed.  DARPA Tech-
nology Transition Needs More Reliable Performance Reporting, 57 GC ¶ 389 
(DARPA “does not consistently assess new technology transition outcomes 
from research environment to military users … [so] GAO is unable to reli-
ably report on transition performance across DARPA’s portfolio[.]”).  As an 
aside, we were disappointed to learn of the demise of DARPA and Boston 
Dynamics’ robotic animal initiative.  See, generally, Keith Wagstaff, Robot 
Mule Put Out to Pasture by Marine Corps, nBC neWs (discussing the LS3 
(Legged Squad Support Systems), called everything from a dog to a mule, 
which “could run for 24 hours straight on a 20-mile mission across rough 
terrain[,]” but proved too loud for its planned mission); ‘Significant Change’ 
Needed For ‘Significant Challenges’ Facing DOD, Gansler Testifies, 57 GC ¶ 
389  (former USD(AT&L) Gansler advocated “reversing the congressional 
and DOD cuts ‘in the share of the budgets going to R&D’ so that DOD can 
‘achieve technological leadership in the 21st century.’); CRS Surveys Ad-
ministration’s R&D Funding Priorities, 57 GC ¶ 91 (Despite the projected 
5.5 percent increase in R&D funding from FY 2015 to 2016, “Congress is 
… facing ‘a period of intense pressure on discretionary spending,’ which 
will influence the growth rate and the allocation of federal R&D funding. 
Further, sequestration and the use of continuing resolutions ‘can affect 
agencies’ execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation 
of planned R&D activities and acquisition of R&D-related equipment,...’”)
Unfortunately, the BBP 3.0 fact sheet has been far less widely dis-
tributed than the (extremely dense) Better Buying Power briefing slide. 
Moreover, if that indeed is was DoD’s intent, we fear it remains lost in the 
implementation and translation.  A visit to the Better Buying Power home 
page, bbp.dau.mil, and the question: “What Is Better Buying Power?” leads 
to the explanation: “AT&L has identified 36 Initiatives grouped under 
seven Focus Areas to restore affordability in defense procurement and 
improve defense industry productivity.”  The seven focus areas include:
• Achieve Affordable Programs
• Control Costs Throughout the Product Lifecycle
• Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry and Govern-
ment
• Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy
• Promote Effective Competition
• Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services
• Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce
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We cannot be the only ones that are struggling to see the pre-eminence 
of the pursuit of technical superiority on this list of focus areas.  To the 
extent that we concede that innovation is part of one of the seven areas 
(Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry and Government), it’s 
worth looking at the initiatives specified under that focus area:
• Align profitability more tightly with Department goals
• Employ appropriate contract types
• Increase use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts in Low Rate 
Initial Production
• Better define value in “best value” competitions
• When  LPTA is used, define Technically Acceptable to ensure 
needed quality
• Institute a superior supplier incentive program
• Increase use of Performance-based Logistics
• Reduce DCAA Audits backlog without compromising effectiveness
• Expand programs to leverage industry’s IR&D
Indeed, other than leveraging the private sector’s IR&D, it’s unclear 
what emphasis, if any, DoD is placing on maintaining technical superior-
ity.  That seems like a significant oversight.
2.  An Interesting Anecdote on Innovation: Given DoD’s, and, 
indeed, the government’s interest in innovation, consider David Mc-
Cullough’s the WrIGht Brothers (2015).  The book is an entertaining and 
informative examination of one of the most iconic and, arguably, significant 
moments in paradigm shifting innovation and, more broadly, research and 
development. Filled with tidbits about the Wright family and, among other 
things, their bicycle business, the book offers bountiful ammunition for 
the theory that small businesses (and individuals) – as opposed to large, 
sophisticated, bureaucratic businesses and institutions – are the most 
fruitful sources of innovation.  
• The Wright Brothers were consistently rebuffed by the 
Federal Government (even, apparently, with attempted Con-
gressional intervention) and, accordingly, secured their initial 
investment and sales abroad.
• On both sides of the Atlantic, governments insisted upon flying 
prototypes, only investing after extensive, highly public dem-
onstrations.  We are not holding our breath on a resurgence in 
what we continue to believe is the correct, conservative, and ef-
ficient approach, but hope spring eternal.  See, by way of contrast, 
Boeing, Lockheed Protest Air Force Bomber Award At GAO, 57 
GC ¶ 357 (“Boeing and Lockheed [asserted] the Air Force’s cost 
evaluation ‘did not properly reward the contractors’ proposals 
to break the upward-spiraling historical cost curves of defense 
acquisitions, or properly evaluate the relative or comparative 
risk of the competitors’ ability to perform, as required by the 
solicitation.’”). Of course, plenty of ink also has been spilled with 
regard to the evolution of the Joint Strike Fighter.  AT&L Praises 
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Marine Corps’ F-35B IOC Declaration, 57 GC ¶ 243 (“The Ma-
rine Corps’ variant of the JSF, the F-35B Lightning II aircraft, 
reached IOC [initial operational capability], with a squadron of 
10 F-35Bs based in Arizona ready for deployment.”); GAO Still 
Finding JSF Development Problems, 57 GC ¶ 117 (“According to 
GAO…, (a) a major part of the airframe severed after about 9,000 
hours of durability testing, and led to fracturing of another part; 
(b) an engine caught fire during takeoff…; and (c) the program 
experienced about 90-percent growth in mission system software 
test points for the year, twice the 45-percent allowance for 2014 
under the test plan.”), see also GAO-15-364.
• The Wright brothers experience was consistent with modern 
empirical research that suggests that breakthrough solutions are 
most likely to come from perspectives outside the scientific 
discipline of the problem at issue.  The Wright Brothers – nei-
ther of whom attended college – dabbled in printing, and did 
quite well for themselves in the nascent bicycle industry, before 
setting their sights on flight.  The brothers appear to have been 
grinders (or tireless workers), masters of observation (of birds), 
exhaustive researchers and experimenters (relying, in large part, 
on trial and error), and as organized as they were methodical (to 
which McCullough attributes their consistent success in their 
frequent patent litigation).
• High profile contests and prizes featured prominently in the 
early evolution of the aviation industry.  It is difficult to avoid 
comparing the early Michelin and Orteig prizes (the former 
won by Wilber Wright in 1908; the latter captured in 1927 by 
Charles Lindbergh in the Spirit of St. Louis) with the more 
modern Xprize, the UK’s 300th-anniversary Longitude Prize, 
and the burgeoning government initiative that underlies Chal-
lenge.gov. See also, generally, Steven L. Schooner & Nathaniel E. 
Castellano, Eyes on the Prize, Head in the Sand: Filling the Due 
Process Vacuum in Federally Administered Contests, 24 federal 
CIrCuIt Bar Journal 391 (2015); Paul Gottlieb and Leonard Ra-
wicz, Federal Inducement Prizes, 15-9 BrIefInG PaPers 1 (August 
2015) (“[I]nducement prizes have specific limitations and are 
not effective for many technological problems[,] but if properly 
designed may produce extraordinary results.”).
• The Wright brothers understood – and fully accepted – the risks 
of their work.  For example, the brothers never flew together 
and witnessed the deaths of many of their contemporaries and 
competitors. Managing risk, rather than simply avoiding risk, 
is critical in innovation. 
E. DoD Continues Its Effort to Analyze Metrics.  For the last two 
years, these materials suggested that some of the most thought-provoking 
reading was found in DoD’s nascent performance, outcome, or metrics, 
initiative.  AT&L Issues First Defense Acquisition System Performance 
Report, 55 GC ¶ 214, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/Report_on_the_
Performance_of_the_Def_Acq_System.pdf; AT&L Releases Second Annual 
DOD Acquisition Assessment, 56 GC ¶ 208; Office of the Under Secretary 
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of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the De-
fense Acquisition System: 2014 Annual Report, available at http://bbp.
dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf; and 
now, AT&L’s Third DOD Acquisition Assessment Scrutinizes Subcontractor 
Margins, Program Baselines, 57 GC ¶ 309. See also, 56 GC ¶ 208, 55 GC 
¶ 214 (for discussion of the prior reports).  As expected, the new report is 
chock-full of intriguing observations and conclusions, including.
• Consistent with the stated (but, arguably, suppressed) BBP 3.0 
theme, discussed above, the report suggests that: “[I]n some 
areas[, DoD] may not be pushing the state-of-the-art enough 
in terms of technical performance. This endangers our mili-
tary technical superiority. .... Simply delivering what was 
initially required on cost and schedule can lead to failure in 
achieving our evolving national security mission—the reason 
defense acquisition exists in the first place….  The confluence 
of a number of results appears to support concern that we may 
be slowing our investment in technical advanced systems….
• “Tight budgets may motivate overly optimistic baselines and 
higher cost-related growth…. [Analysis shows] a very strong 
correlation between high acquisition cost growth for programs 
and tight budgetary environments (like the one at present) 
during program baselining. ...[I]t should give us all pause that 
acquisition unit cost growth on such programs is consistently 
3-times higher (about 30 percent versus 10 percent) than that 
for programs started when budgets are not as constrained.  
• Since 2001, first-tier subcontractors earned higher mar-
gins than their associated prime contractors on the same 
program (at the median, about 2 percentage points higher in de-
velopment and about 7 percentage points higher in production). 
… [The differences] illustrate why the DoD has been working 
… to motivate prime contractors to control subcontractor prices 
and ensure that profitability is aligned with performance—es-
pecially in production where the difference in margins is large. 
[DoD is] also concerned that higher subcontract margins may 
be motivating companies to bid on fewer prime contracts and 
thus reduce competition at that level. This information will be 
used to inform contract negotiations.
• Not all acquisition reform attempts have been beneficial.
We encourage the acquisition, oversight, budgeting, and planning com-
munities to applaud and support DoD’s efforts.  We also encourage DoD 
to evolve past a fascination with our longstanding, generally unhelpful, 
and popular-primarily-because-they’re-easy-to-measure metrics (price, 
schedule, performance specifications) associated with the award – rather 
than the outcome – of the contract.  Specifically, increased attention to 
quantifying more meaningful measures such as life cycle cost, bang for the 
buck, value for money spent, and customer satisfaction obtained would be 
a step in the right direction.  Along those lines, a recent anecdote demon-
strating that titles (or words) and metrics (what you measure) matters, see 
Suspension And Debarment Programs Continue To Improve, ISDC Reports, 
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57 GC ¶ 108 (“In fiscal year 2014, agencies improved their suspension and 
debarment (S&D) programs, and the numbers of S&D actions continued to 
increase, the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC) 
has reported. … [Yet, t]he ISDC emphasized that the overall numbers of 
S&D actions are not metrics of success.”)
F. Consolidation of the Industrial Base.  As defense procurement 
spending contracts (see above), DoD faces increasing pressure to work 
with private industry to facilitate consolidation.  Particularly to the extent 
that DoD is increasingly loath to pay for excess capacity, consolidation 
seems unavoidable. We’ve been through this before, and it’s a painful, 
painstaking process. For now, however, DoD seems to have backed itself 
into a corner.  Defense Secretary Cautions Against Further Consolidation 
Among Large Primes, 57 GC ¶ 314 (SecDef Ash Carter stated the desire “to 
avoid excessive consolidation in the defense industry, to the point where 
we [do] not have multiple vendors who could compete with one another on 
many programs.” USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall added that: “With size comes 
power, and the department’s experience with large defense contractors 
is that they are not hesitant to use this power for corporate advantage.”)
G. Reducing Cost Drivers: A Tepid Start.  Despite frustration with 
the (perceived as excessive) overhead rates that contractors charge, DoD 
remains largely powerless to reduce the panoply of “cost drivers” that, in 
large part, derive from a never ending succession of Congressional man-
dates.   Nonetheless, many observers were curious to see how the report 
of the BBP-inspired initiative to address this issue.  The initial results are 
now available, and, despite the volume of the report, little progress was 
obtained.  See, generally, Mark Husband & David J. Nicholls, Eliminating 
Requirements Imposed on Industry Where Costs Exceed Benefits (September 
29, 2015), http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/docs/Eliminating-Requirements-
Imposed-on-Industry-Study-Report-2015.pdf. For a timely anecdote on 
this topic, see, for example, Navy Should Improve Berry Amendment, Buy 
American Compliance, 57 GC  ¶ 268 (“Officials omitted required clauses 
or failed to assess compliance because they were unaware of the require-
ments, made administrative errors or used a faulty clause matrix.”).
DoD poignantly observed that: “Actions that are unnecessary or of 
little value for acquisition directly add costs, introduce delays in delivering 
capability, and bar innovative new entrants. Here, we examined several 
specific instances of regulatory burdens or their implementation imposed 
on industry in order to eliminate unnecessary or unproductive actions.” 
That seemed rather promising. DoD, however, appears to have taken a 
formalistic, rather than a pragmatic (or results-oriented) approach, and, 
in doing so, defeated the purpose.  
“Unnecessary” and “unproductive” are the key adjectives here. 
Statute and regulation are not arbitrary but are designed 
to serve a purpose. The Department of Defense manages a 
huge taxpayer investment and must provide transparency for 
oversight to assess efficiency, fairness of the acquisition system, 
and compliance with broader national, social, and economic 
objectives. Additionally, many regulations are a response to 
previous acquisition failures and are intended to prevent 
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recurrence. Attempts to save money by eliminating actions 
without considering these impacts/benefits are necessarily 
inappropriate. So, the central challenge of this work was to 
identify activities which could be eliminated with no or 
minimal impact on statutory or regulatory objectives.
We disagree and, rather, read that starting point as a prospective 
capitulation.  We think the question that needs to be asked is: whether 
the costs associated with individual statutes and regulations are 
worth it to the DoD customer? It’s time to go back to the drawing board.
Fortunately, DoD concedes that: “There are many areas where the de-
tails of implementation are creating unnecessary or unproductive work.” 
Alas, “just as such burdens were not created in a single step, decreasing 
them will also be an incremental, continuous improvement process.”  Our 
sense is that DoD will need to be far more aggressive the next time around 
if it hopes to maintain the status quo – merely reducing burdens at a rate 
similar to that which Congress adds them – let alone significantly reduc-
ing burdens that inject inefficiency into the procurement process, inflate 
contractors’ overhead, erect barrier to entry against commercial firms and 
new entrants, and frustrate the DoD customer.
VI.  THINKING BROADLY: THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE, 
THE BUDGET, AND GOOD DECISION-MAKING. 
Early in 2015, the Professional Services Council released its biennial 
2014 Acquisition Policy Survey. (As always, these targeted surveys are 
not large enough to be statistically precise, but we have found them to 
be informative, thoughtful, consistently on point, and, accordingly, well 
received.) See also Acquisition Survey Points To Persisting Budget Insta-
bility, Workforce Skill Gaps, 57 GC ¶ 48.  Like its predecessors, this report 
makes a number of significant observations.  
• The skills of the acquisition workforce … continue to be a 
primary concern. The overwhelming majority of respondents 
continued to cite significant weaknesses in critical skills areas 
including business acumen, negotiating skills, and conducting 
complex information technology acquisitions. …[N]o respondent 
ranked workforce business acumen as being excellent; and only 
20 percent rated it as “good.” … [W]hile over two-thirds of re-
spondents said they believe negotiating skills are important or 
extremely important in acquisition, only a small fraction said 
they believe their workforce has adequate negotiating skills…. 
• [The acquisition workforce concerns are] exacerbated by the 
now-evident generation gap[.] The expected retirement wave is 
now underway and the anticipated “bathtub” (the gap between 
senior leaders and the next layer down) is equally evident … 
causing an increased rate of experience and knowledge loss.
• [T]he budget [and lack of certainty about funding were again 
identified as] the top barrier to optimal performance. ... Budget 
instability restricts spending on training and the hiring of 
needed resources. Not knowing programmatic funding levels 
precludes effective tradeoff analyses and planning. Programs 
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place an overemphasis on cost savings as opposed to program-
matic outcomes as a principal goal of the acquisition process. 
This then naturally translates into a similarly narrow oversight 
perspective on cost elements, often at the expense of a more 
holistic view which, when combined with an already punitive 
oversight environment in which collaboration is not encouraged, 
ultimately has a chilling effect on the process as a whole….
• There appeared to be little agreement on the role of tradeoff 
analyses or business case assessments to achieve innovation, 
and similarly little connection to the type of acquisition strat-
egy or vehicle employed. … [LPTA] continues to be an area of 
substantial disconnect between the government acquisition 
community and its industry partners. Anecdotally, and uncon-
nected to this survey, there is evidence of growing concern 
among agency “customers” about the mission and performance 
impacts being felt by the over-use or misapplication of LPTA 
strategies. [Bear in mind that the survey preceded the release 
of the Kendall LPTA memorandum, discussed above.]
• [Despite] the [acknowledged] need for oversight/compliance,… 
the extent of activity in this area [remains] a significant burden. 
… [Respondents] identified ongoing problems with burden-
some oversight and compliance demands related to small 
business goal achievement, IG audits (and, for defense agencies, 
DCAA audits), GAO activity, and budget requirements. The sheer 
volume of regular data calls, ill-defined data calls, and ad-hoc 
data calls combine to weigh on an agency’s procurement office. 
Additionally, auditors can lack functional knowledge of acqui-
sitions, which distracts procurement staff as they educate the 
auditors regarding acquisitions. 
VII. A BLAST FROM THE PAST: CHARGE CARD  
MANAGEMENT
While it’s not a surprise, it helps to be reminded that even the most basic 
organization and oversight requires consistent attention and vigilance.  GSA 
Charge And Travel Card Program Risk Rises, 57 GC ¶ 313 (It’s nice to know 
that, at a minimum, “GSA runs monthly queries of transactions for question-
able terms – such as ‘casino,’ ‘movies’ or ‘adult.’”); IGs Find Varying Compliance 
With Charge Card Usage Rules, 57 GC ¶ 254 (Among other things, the IG 
found that, while “DHS has established internal controls for both purchase 
and travel cards, … it has not ensured that its components follow depart-
mental rules[.]”  The IG also analyzed DHS purchase card transactions at 
Starbucks, resulting in the startling conclusion that these transactions “may 
give the appearance that cardholders are not seeking lower priced options 
based on personal preference.”); Senate Committee, IGs Tackle Purchase Card 
Abuse, 57 GC ¶ 210, www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2015/20150629-15-N-0171.
pdf,  www.nsf.gov/oig/_ pdf/15-2-008-travel-card.pdf; DOD Travel Cards 
Used At Casinos, Adult-Entertainment Establishments, 57 GC ¶ 163 (Over a 
one-year period, “2,636 DOD travel cardholders had 4,437 transactions worth 
$952,258 that were likely for personal use at casinos and 900 transactions 
worth $96,576 by 646 cardholders at adult-entertainment establishments.”).
